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I. INTRODUCTION
Uber Technologies, Inc.1 (Uber) makes finding a ride easy: open
the Uber app, set a pick-up location, request the Uber, and the ride
arrives in a matter of minutes with payment made entirely through
the application.  This simplicity transformed Uber from a ten-by-ten-
foot cubicle to one of the fastest growing startup companies in his-
tory—reaching a $51 billion valuation in only five years.2  Despite
Uber’s initial success, litigation regarding whether its drivers are in-
dependent contractors or employees threatens its current model.
According to the California District Court, Uber is not off the hook
because the drivers are not independent contractors as a matter of
law.  Further, another ride platform in the sharing economy, Lyft, has
encountered similar misclassification litigation, and the California
District Court reached the same result—Lyft drivers are not necessa-
rily independent contractors.  Importantly, courts have noted the diffi-
culties in applying the current labor laws to the drivers of Uber and
1. UBER, https://www.uber.com [https://perma.unl.edu/VT5N-YCGV].
2. Max Chafkin, What Makes Uber Run, FAST COMPANY, Oct. 2015, at 110, 115.
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Lyft and suggest new rules may need to be developed exclusively for
the “sharing economy.”3
This Note discusses whether ride platform drivers are employees
or independent contractors and further illustrates the difficulty in an-
swering this question in light of the sharing economy.  Classifying
these drivers into the categories of “employee” or “independent con-
tractor” is no easy feat—workers in the sharing economy do not
clearly fit within the traditional definitions of these two categories.
While Uber and Lyft drivers do not clearly fit the traditional definition
of employee, the difficult question for the sharing economy is whether
they should be classified as such.  In view of this difficulty, a new clas-
sification category should be developed for these workers to provide
some protections without hindering innovation.
Part II of this Note provides a background on the sharing economy
in relation to the increasing dilemma of worker misclassification and
discusses the legal framework in determining whether a worker is an
employee under both California law and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.  Part III provides background on the litigation that ride platforms
in the sharing economy have encountered, discussing first the Califor-
nia Labor Commission decision in Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
which addresses the misclassification issues pertaining to Uber.  Part
III also discusses O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., another Uber
misclassification case and Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., which involves the al-
leged misclassification of the Lyft platform’s drivers.  Part IV explores
the difficulties associated with attempting to classify these drivers
within the current framework under California and federal law and
argues a new test should be developed in light of the sharing economy.
Part V concludes Uber and Lyft drivers should not be considered em-
ployees or independent contractors, but rather a new classification
should be developed—giving these drivers some of the protections pro-
vided to employees without hindering innovation in the sharing
economy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The “Sharing Economy”
As a result of the economic downturn in recent years, “values such
as collaboration and sharing have been embraced and celebrated, and
new technologies, especially social media and smartphones, have rein-
forced these developments.”4  This change in economic values has
been referred to as the sharing economy and is highly centered on the
3. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter
v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
4. Ethan Katsh & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology and Dispute System Design:
Lessons from the “Sharing Economy”, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2015, at 8, 10.
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use of technology5 in fostering collaboration.6  More specifically, the
sharing economy is defined as entailing:
(1) a latent or otherwise underutilized supply of a good or service that is put to
productive use by an independent workforce that does not fit within the tradi-
tional employer–employee relationship; (2) a relationship of trust that is diffi-
cult to regulate; and (3) a need for a degree of freedom to experiment and
innovate within the relationship of trust and beyond.7
The sharing economy promotes community ownership, sharing, collab-
oration, small-scale enterprise, and the regrowth of economic prosper-
ity.8  It has been referred to as “the next wave of economic growth.”9
Uber, a ridesharing service, is one of the many innovative companies
that define this economy.
While the sharing economy has its technological and collaborative
advantages, there are a number of distinct disadvantages as well.10
In this new economy, perceived drawbacks include legal gray areas
and uncertainty resulting from blurred traditional legal boundaries.11
However, as one commentator has noted, “the very fact that activi-
ties in the sharing economy cannot be put into traditional legal boxes
tells us something very powerful and hopeful: these activities are radi-
cally different from what we have been doing for the past century.”12
The unique and innovative approaches to the new economy make it
increasingly difficult to classify the relationships into the legal
frameworks that currently exist.13  One legal gray area greatly im-
pacting the sharing economy is whether the drivers for ride platforms,
such as Uber and Lyft, are employees or independent contractors.14
Imposing a classification upon drivers of these platforms “with too
heavy a hand would undermine the ability of sharing economy provid-
ers and platforms to take advantage of their critical strategic advan-
tages: direct, peer-to-peer ease of access, and relatively low cost.”15
Therefore, whether these drivers are independent contractors or em-
5. Josh Krauss, The Sharing Economy: How State and Local Governments Are Fail-
ing and Why We Need Congress to Get Involved, 44 SW. L. REV. 365, 367 (2014).
6. Katsh & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 4, at 10.
7. Raymond H. Brescia, Regulating the Sharing Economy: New and Old Insights
into an Oversight Regime for the Peer-to-Peer Economy, 95 NEB. L. REV. 87, 94
(2016) (citation omitted).
8. Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2 (2012).
9. Krauss, supra note 5, at 366.
10. Sofia Ranchorda´s, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 466 (2015).
11. Id. at 420.
12. Kassan & Orsi, supra note 8, at 13.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Brescia, supra note 7, at 100.
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ployees is one crucial question looming over both the companies and
workers in this economy.16
B. Who Is an Employee?
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), to name a few,
are federal laws which provide certain protections to workers classi-
fied as employees.  In defining which workers of an employer are em-
ployees, misclassification as independent contractors can occur.  This
section examines the role of misclassification in the sharing economy,
explains the test for whether a worker is an employee under one of the
federal laws listed above, the FLSA, and further describes the test
under California wage and hour laws.
1. Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors
Companies—in order to comply with the many different federal
and state laws regulating labor and employment—must classify their
workers as independent contractors or employees.17  According to the
U.S. Department of Labor, misclassification of workers has been found
in a vast number of workplaces throughout the United States.18
When employers misclassify their workers as independent contrac-
tors, they evade protections afforded to employees under federal and
state laws.  For instance, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) re-
quires the payment of minimum wage and overtime to employees;19
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides certain rights to
employees, such as the right to self-organize, join labor organizations,
bargain collectively through representatives, and engage in concerted
activities;20 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
protects the interests of employees in their pension and welfare bene-
fit plans;21 and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles
some employees to take leave for medical reasons, the birth or adop-
tion of a child, or for the care of a child, spouse, or parent.22  Any em-
ployee misclassified as an independent contractor would be without
the protections under each one of these federal laws.
16. Michael Malloy, Independent Contractors and the ‘Sharing Economy’: Court
Sends Uber Drivers’ Case to Jury, 20 ME. EMP. L. LETTER 2 (2015).
17. David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four
Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 138 (2015).
18. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO.
2015-1, at 1 (July 15, 2015) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1].
19. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
20. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
21. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
22. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2012).
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Misclassification is defined “as a purposeful and intentional action
that results in illegally depriving employees of employment protec-
tions along with tax evasion that correlates to a loss of federal and
state revenue.”23  While misclassification sometimes occurs as a result
of uncertainty, many companies misclassify intentionally in order to
gain a competitive edge.24
The classification categories have grown murkier as a result of the
sharing economy.25  Many companies in the sharing economy rely on
classifying workers as independent contractors.26  Classification as an
independent contractor allows startup companies in the sharing econ-
omy to avoid traditional labor costs, such as employee benefits and
insurance.27  Although classifying workers as independent contractors
has its benefits, misclassifying workers is a “problematic trend”28 be-
cause it leaves employees without protections.  Litigation involving
Uber and Lyft arose when drivers alleged that they had been misclas-
sified as independent contractors.29  Therefore, in the sharing econ-
omy, determining who is an employee becomes a challenging, but
important, question.
2. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
This subsection examines one federal law, the FLSA, and its test
for whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor.  Many
of the other federal labor and employment laws have tests similar to
the one delineated in the FLSA.
In 1938, Congress enacted the FLSA30 following the Great Depres-
sion.31  President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged for legislation on labor
standards32 as part of the New Deal—a series of legislation aimed at
23. Bauer, supra note 17, at 140–41.
24. Id. at 141.
25. Gillian B. White, In the Sharing Economy, No One’s an Employee, ATLANTIC
(JUNE 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/in-the-shar
ing-economy-no-ones-an-employee/395027/ [https://perma.unl.edu/TX23-LC5R].
26. Lauren Doroghazi, States Targeting Employee Misclassification, MULTISTATE IN-
SIDER (July 23, 2015), https://www.multistate.com/insider/2015/08/states-target
ing-employee-misclassification/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6R5S-TVLC].
27. Ellen Hurt, Contractor or Employee? Silicon Valley’s Branding Dilemma, FORBES
(Nov. 18, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/11/18/con
tractor-or-employee-silicon-valleys-branding-dilemma/.
28. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 1.
29. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
30. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
31. GERALD MAYER, BENJAMIN COLLINS & DAVID H. BRADLEY, THE FAIR LABOR STAN-
DARDS ACT (FLSA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (2013).  It was during this time that President
Franklin D. Roosevelt endorsed the New Deal. Id.
32. John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 464 (1939).
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stimulating the United States economy.33  The Senate Committee on
Education and Labor stated the purpose of the FLSA was to “protect
[the] Nation from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low
to buy the bare necessities of life and from long hours of work injuri-
ous to health.”34  The express congressional intent in enacting the
FLSA was to protect workers from low wages, excessive hours, and
child labor.35
Under the FLSA, every employer shall pay its employees the desig-
nated minimum wage.36  Further, employees must be paid overtime
wages if they work more than forty hours a week.37  An employer is
defined under the FLSA as “any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,”38 while em-
ployee is defined as “any individual employed by an employer.”39
Lastly, “employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.”40
As stated by the Supreme Court, the FLSA should be liberally con-
strued in favor of broad coverage to effectuate the purposes of the
Act.41  Congress—by explicitly defining all aspects of employment
under the FLSA—rejected the common law’s definition of employment
under the common-law control test.42  The definitions under the FLSA
provide protections to a broader class of workers than under the com-
mon law.43  Because of Congress’s expansive definition of the word
“employ” as “to suffer or permit to work,”44 the meaning of employee
under the Act is stretched beyond the limits of the common law
definitions.45
The Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts adopted the eco-
nomic-realities test to determine who is classified as an employee
33. MAYER, COLLINS & BRADLEY, supra note 31.
34. S. 2475, S. REP. NO. 75-884 (1937).
35. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
36. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
37. Id. § 207.
38. Id. § 203(d).
39. Id. § 203(e)(1).
40. Id. § 203(g).
41. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985).
42. See Walling v. Portland, 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947) (“[I]n determining who are
‘employees’ under the Act, common law employee categories or employer-em-
ployee classifications under other states are not of controlling significance.  This
Act contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application
to many persons and working relationships, which prior to this Act, were not
deemed to fall within an employer-employee category.”).
43. Id.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
45. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (analyzing the
definition of ‘employee’ under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) and finding the definition to be more broad under FLSA than
ERISA).
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under the FLSA.46  The economic-realities test looks at multiple fac-
tors—with no one factor being determinative—when evaluating an
employment relationship:47
[C]ourts generally look at (1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged em-
ployer over the worker; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the
worker’s investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the working rela-
tionship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and (6) the ex-
tent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s
business.48
If these factors favor the conclusion that the worker is economically
dependent on the employer, they will be considered an employee.49
Although the FLSA should be liberally construed, it is not broad
enough to bring independent contractors within its reach.50  An inde-
pendent contractor is a worker that is economically “in business for
himself [or herself]”51 or economically independent from that of the
alleged employer.  The classification of the worker as an independent
contractor is not determinative.  Courts should not limit themselves to
the mere terminology of the parties—instead, courts should analyze
the relationship through the economic-realities test.52  Therefore, “the
economic realities of the relationship, and not the label the employer
gives it, are determinative.”53
3. California Wage and Hour Laws
The California wage-and-hour laws are explained in this Note be-
cause litigation regarding the classification of Uber and Lyft drivers
has occurred mainly in California.  While California courts are the
first to take on this issue, it is likely other state courts will tackle the
issue in the future, applying their own wage-and-hour laws to the
problem.
Under § 218(a) of the FLSA, “[n]o provision of [the] chapter or of
any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or
State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage
46. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301; see also Goldberg v. Whitaker
House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961) (holding the home workers were employ-
ees under the economic reality test for employment—rather than the common
law test).
47.  INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 4.
48. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998).
49. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 4.
50. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728–29 (1947) (“We have de-
cided that it is not so broad as to include those ‘who, without any express or
implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the
premises of another.’” (quoting Walling v. Portland, 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947))).
51. Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008); Baker, 137 F.3d
at 1440.
52. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1989).
53. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 5.
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higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a
maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established
under this chapter . . . .”54  With this provision, the FLSA explicitly
provided for regulation by the states of labor conditions55 and did not
entirely preempt state law.56  The federal statute does not occupy the
entire field of labor conditions.57  Instead, FLSA leaves room for states
to supplement the law regarding working conditions and wages as
they see fit.58  Therefore, “if states enact minimum wage, overtime, or
child labor laws that are more protective of employees than what is
provided by the FLSA, the state law applies.”59  This results in multi-
ple wage and hour laws throughout the United States with differing
tests for employment.60
For instance, in determining whether a worker is an independent
contractor or an employee under California law,61 the California Su-
preme Court in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial
Relations developed a multifactor test.62 Borello established the com-
mon-law control test: whether the alleged employer has the right to
control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.63
However, this test in isolation is of little use in evaluating the employ-
ment relationship64 because it does not consider other factors that can
establish the existence of an employment relationship.  Therefore, the
court set out a number of secondary factors to be evaluated in conjunc-
tion with the common-law control test.65  One important secondary
54. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2012).
55. Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perez-Rosado, 641 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1981) (“In
a preemption case . . . one must first determine whether the federal statute pro-
hibits any and all state regulation on that particular activity.  The FLSA does not
expressly prohibit state legislation in the area of wages and working
conditions.”).
56. Chandler v. Cheesecake Factory Rests., Inc., 239 F.R.D. 432, 436 (M.D.N.C.
2006).
57. Maccabees, 641 F.2d at 46.
58. Id.
59.  MAYER, COLLINS & BRADLEY, supra note 31, at 3.
60. Id.
61. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1 (West 2016).
62. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal.
1989).  Although the Borello court set out the test for ascertaining an employ-
ment relationship in the context of California’s workers’ compensation laws, this
is the test that has been applied by the courts while analyzing the employment
relationship under the California Labor Code and other employment statutes.
See O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1139 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing
the Borello court’s multifactor test for whether a worker is an independent con-
tractor or employee as applied to the California Labor Code).
63. Borello, 769 P.2d at 403.
64. Id. at 404.
65. Id.
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factor is the right to terminate the employment relationship at will.66
Other secondary factors—derived from agency law—include:
(a) [W]hether the one performing the services is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion or business; (b) the kind of occupation[;] . . . (c) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method
of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a
part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties
believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.67
These individual factors should not be employed as separate tests—
the result in any case will depend on the weight of all factors in combi-
nation.68  The Borello court also found the six-factor economic-reali-
ties test applied in the FLSA context was relevant to the
determination of whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor under California law.69
III. LITIGATION FOR RIDE PLATFORMS IN THE SHARING
ECONOMY
Uber and Lyft, the main ride platforms in the sharing economy,
have been plagued by litigation regarding whether their drivers are
independent contractors or employees.
A. Trouble for Uber Begins in Berwick v. Uber Technologies,
Inc.
In Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a California labor commis-
sion held one Uber driver was misclassified as an independent con-
tractor.70  Although this opinion applied only to the one driver and
was a non-binding labor commission decision, it could have major im-
plications in the sharing economy.71  A successful ruling on a misclas-
sification allegation for one driver could entice other drivers to
challenge their classification as independent contractors.  The Ber-
wick decision sparked the hurdle of misclassification to innovation
and growth in the sharing economy.
66. Id.
67. Id. (explaining the factors “are intertwined, and their weight depends on particu-
lar combinations”).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 406–07.
70. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *1 (Cal.
Dept. Lab. June 3, 2015).
71. Sam Sanders, California Labor Commissions Rules Uber Driver is an Employee,
Not a Contractor, NPR (June 17, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2015/06/17/415262801/california-labor-commission-rules-uber-
driver-is-an-employee-not-a-contractor [https://perma.unl.edu/2RA3-MUT3].
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1. Facts
Plaintiff Barbara Ann Berwick worked as a driver for Uber Tech-
nologies, Inc. in San Francisco.72  Uber’s written agreement imposed
many requirements on Berwick as a driver.73  For instance, the perti-
nent provisions of the agreement required drivers to maintain a
model-approved vehicle, receive payment as a service fee predeter-
mined by Uber, undergo Uber’s screening process, attend an informa-
tional session regarding the Uber application, and not accept any tips
from passengers.74
The court outlined a number of other requirements Berwick was
subject to at the time she was a driver for Uber.  If a driver was inac-
tive for 180 days, the smartphone application expired.75  The driver
was required to pay a fee and obtain a permit from the California Pub-
lic Utilities Commission in order to carry passengers, and the driver
must have had liability insurance coverage.76  Uber also performed
background checks on its prospective drivers.77  Uber had quality con-
trol measures in place—a driver received star ratings based on the
passenger’s total experience during the ride.78  A driver must have
maintained a star rating of 4.6 stars or higher (out of a possible 5) in
order to continue driving for Uber.79  Lastly, Uber did not reimburse
its drivers for any expenses related to their transportation services.80
Barbara Berwick filed a claim against Uber Technologies, Inc. with
the Labor Commissioner’s office in California alleging she was owed
unpaid wages and reimbursement of her expenses while driving for
Uber.81  Uber asserted Berwick was not an employee, but rather an
independent contractor because they exercised little control over when
and how Berwick drove for Uber.82  Therefore, they argued she was
“not entitled to recover any claimed wages or to be reimbursed for her
expenses.”83
2. California Labor Commission Finds Uber Driver Is Employee
The labor commissioner analyzed the factors set out in S.G. Borello
& Sons, Inc. v. Department Of Industrial Relations84 and determined
72. Berwick, 2015 WL 4153765, at *8.
73. Id. at *2.
74. Id. at *2–4.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *4–5; see infra subsection IV.B.3.
83. Id. at *4.
84.  769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
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Berwick was an employee of Uber—rather than an independent con-
tractor.85  Uber argued in the alternative that Berwick was not an em-
ployee because Uber lacked the requisite control of an “employer”—
the principle test for employment under California law.86  However,
Borello does not require complete control over a worker’s activities.87
All Borello requires is that Uber, “[b]y obtaining the clients in need of
the [ride] service and providing the workers to conduct it, retained all
necessary control over the operation as a whole.”88  Therefore, the
Commissioner held there was a presumption of employment89—and
Uber failed to satisfy its burden of proving that Berwick was an inde-
pendent contractor.  Further, the Labor Commissioner found Ber-
wick’s work was integral to Uber’s business of “providing
transportation services to passengers.”90  Without the drivers’ trans-
portation of passengers, Uber would not exist.91
Although Uber asserted they are nothing more than a technologi-
cal platform, the commissioner found they were involved in every part
of the transaction between the drivers and the passengers.92  For in-
stance, Uber requires all prospective drivers to pass a background
check before they commence use of Uber’s application.93  It has certain
specifications requiring the type of automobile that can be used by an
Uber driver.94  Passengers of Uber pay a certain fee directly to Uber—
with Uber then remitting a non-negotiable service fee to their driv-
ers,95 and drivers are discouraged from accepting passenger tips.96
Lastly, drivers without a personal smartphone receive an iPhone from
Uber so they may perform their work.97
Therefore, the California Labor Commissioner held Berwick was
an employee of Uber and she was entitled to the expenses she incurred
as an Uber driver.98
85. Berwick, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6.
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *6.
92. Id. at *9.
93. Id. at *6.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *8.
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B. California District Court Weighs in: O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc.
1. Facts
Plaintiffs Douglas O’Connor and Thomas Colopy drove for Uber’s
“UberBlack”—the premium Uber service.99  Both O’Connor and
Colopy rented limousines for UberBlack from third-party limousine
companies.100  Plaintiffs Matthew Manaham and Elie Gurfinkel drove
for the low cost Uber service, “UberX.”101  Manaham and Gurfinkel
transported passengers in their own personal vehicles.102  Manaham
was a self-employed screenwriter who drove for UberX in Los Ange-
les.103  Gurfinkel was employed full time when he began driving for
Uber, but he soon after left his job and drove for Uber full time.104
These plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and
other Uber drivers in the State of California.105  They claimed they
are employees of Uber and thus eligible for the statutory protections
provided to employees in the California Labor Code.106  The drivers
argued that Uber must provide certain protections to its drivers, in-
cluding the requirement that “an employer pass on the entire amount
of any gratuity ‘that is paid, given to, or left for an employee by a
patron.’”107
Before becoming drivers for Uber, plaintiffs and other prospective
drivers had to first complete Uber’s application process.108  This pro-
cess entails uploading a driver’s license, providing information about
vehicle registration and insurance, and passing a background
check.109  Further, prospective drivers are required to pass a “city
knowledge test” and attend an interview with an Uber employee.110
Lastly, all drivers must sign a contract111 stating they are indepen-
dent contractors—not employees—of Uber in order to begin transport-
ing passengers.112  Under the terms of the contract, the entire amount
99. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1136.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1135
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 2016)).
108. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.  The relevant provisions of the contract provided that the relationship be-
tween the drivers and Uber “ ‘is solely that of independent contracting parties.’
The parties ‘expressly agree that this Agreement is not an employment agree-
ment or employment relationship.’” Id. (citation omitted).
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of the passenger’s payment first goes to Uber, with Uber remitting
payment less Uber’s fees to the drivers thereafter.113  The amount
paid to drivers usually amounts to around 20% of the total amount
billed to a passenger.114
Uber contended it is not a transportation company, but rather, a
technology company—providing a “lead generation platform,” which
connects drivers with those individuals desiring rides.115  Uber does
not own any of the vehicles and argued that it does not “employ” driv-
ers.  Instead, Uber characterized the drivers as its “partners.”116
Plaintiffs described their relationship with Uber differently.  While
Uber contended it is not a transportation company, it previously re-
ferred to itself as such,117 by using the marketing tagline, “Everyone’s
Private Driver.”118  Additionally, Uber was deeply involved in all as-
pects of the driver’s operations—from marketing to selecting drivers,
regulating and monitoring their performance, and setting prices.119
Throughout the litigation, Uber continued to assert the drivers
were independent contractors and, therefore, not entitled to the pro-
tections afforded to employees provided in the California Labor
Code.120  In support of its theory, Uber argued it does not exercise
significant control over its transportation providers.  For instance, the
drivers “set their own hours and work schedules, provide their own
vehicles, and are subject to little direct supervision.”121  Plaintiffs dis-
puted these contentions and argued that they were employees under
the legal standard set out in Borello.122
2. The California District Court Weighs in on Uber’s Alleged
Misclassification
Uber moved for summary judgment regarding the employment
classification of the plaintiffs and all other drivers represented in the
class as independent contractors.  The parties conceded that the anal-
ysis of whether the drivers are employees consisted of two stages.123
The first stage entailed the plaintiffs producing evidence that they
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.  Further, Uber has also marketed itself as an “On-Demand Car Service.” Id.
When Uber decided to expand into untapped international markets, the CEO,
Travis Kalanick stated, “we’re rolling out a transportation system in a city near
you.” Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1138.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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provided services for Uber.124  If the plaintiffs produced such evi-
dence, a rebuttable presumption arises that the plaintiffs are employ-
ees and the relationship is that of employee/employer.125  The second
stage occurs once this presumption arises—“the burden then shifts to
the employer to prove, if it can, that the ‘presumed employee was an
independent contractor.”’126  In determining whether an employer can
overcome the presumption, courts in California look to the Borello
multifactor test.127
As to the first stage of the inquiry, the court held because plaintiffs
and other Uber drivers provide a service to Uber, they are Uber’s pre-
sumptive employees.128  Uber’s assertion that it is a technology com-
pany and not a transportation company was flawed in the court’s eyes
because it focused on the mechanics of its technology rather than on
what Uber actually does.129  Uber’s business consists of selling rides
to customers, not selling software.130  The court found that, without
the drivers, Uber would not be able to function as a transportation
company, because Uber is dependent on revenue generated from rides
provided by those drivers.131  This established that the drivers per-
form an essential service to Uber by giving rides to customers.132
While drivers are essential for Uber to obtain revenue, only Uber con-
trols the amount of revenue it earns by setting the fare rates.133  This
control over the fare charged to a rider “further demonstrates that
Uber acts as more than a mere passive intermediary between riders
and drivers.”134  The court further reasoned that Uber exercises sub-
stantial control over the selection and retention of its drivers by re-
quiring prospective drivers to pass a background check, city
knowledge exam, vehicle inspection, and personal interview.135  Uber
has terminated drivers unable to perform at the level that Uber deems
satisfactory.136  The drivers provided an “indispensable service”137 to
124. Id. (quoting Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010)).
125. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138.
126. Id. (quoting Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2010)).
127. Id. at 1138.
128. Id. at 1141.
129. Id.  (“Uber’s self-definition as a mere ‘technology company’ focuses exclusively on
the mechanics of its platform (i.e., the use of internet enabled smartphones and
software applications) rather than on the substance of what Uber actually does
(i.e., enable customers to book and receive rides).”).
130. Id. at 1142.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1143. (“We will be deactivating Uber accounts regularly of drivers who are
in the bottom 5% of all Uber drivers and not performing up to the highest stan-
dards . . . . We believe that the removal of underperforming drivers will lead to
more opportunities for our best drivers.”).
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Uber,138 and therefore, the court found the drivers were Uber’s pre-
sumptive employees.139
Since the employees proved they provided a service to Uber, and
are thereby Uber’s presumptive employees, the burden shifted to Uber
to rebut the presumption of an employment relationship.140  The court
held Uber failed to meet the summary judgment standard—that
Uber’s drivers are independent contractors as a matter of law.141  In
deciding whether Uber satisfied the standard for summary judgment,
the court looked to the Borello multifactor test.  The court found the
principal factor of whether Uber controlled the “manner and means of
accomplishing the result desired” (the “control factor”) was in dis-
pute.142  In looking at the control factor in isolation, the court found
summary judgment to be inappropriate.143  Because this primary fac-
tor was in dispute, the court did not analyze the other factors in
Borello.  The court maintained that “a reasonable jury could find that
numerous secondary factors cut in favor of finding an employment re-
lationship.”144  As a matter of law, the court could not conclude the
drivers were independent contractors, and not employees of Uber.145
Therefore, Uber’s motion for summary judgment was denied.146
C. Lyft Encounters Misclassification Litigation in Cotter v.
Lyft
1. Facts
Lyft, another ride platform, functions very similarly to Uber—it
operates a smartphone application, which connects passengers need-
137. Id.
138. Id. (“Uber’s drivers provide an ‘indispensable service’ to Uber, and the firm ‘could
no more survive without them’ than it could without a working smartphone app.
Or, put more colloquially, Uber could not be ‘Everyone’s Private Driver’ without
the drivers.”).
139. Id. at 1145 (“This court holds, as a matter of law, that Uber’s drivers render ser-
vice to Uber, and thus are Uber’s presumptive employees.”).
140. Id.
141. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.  The court, in discussing the standard on a
motion for summary judgment, reasoned:
Uber may only maintain summary judgment if all facts and evidentiary
inferences material to the employee/independent contractor determina-
tion are undisputed, and a reasonable jury viewing those undisputed
facts and inferences could reach but one conclusion—that Uber’s drivers
are independent contractors are a matter of law . . . .  [This standard] is
one that Uber has failed to meet here.
Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1149.
144. Id. at 1152.
145. Id. at 1153.
146. Id.
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ing a ride to nearby drivers.147  In order to become a driver for Lyft, a
person “must download the app, submit his car for inspection, undergo
some form of background check, and submit to an in-person interview
with a Lyft representative.”148 Lyft requires that its drivers maintain
a ride acceptance rate above 75%.149  A driver’s account will be deacti-
vated if its acceptance rate does not improve above 75% after receiving
three warnings.150  Further, passengers provide ratings of drivers on
a scale of one to five stars.151  A driver whose star rating falls below a
certain threshold is subject to termination.152  Lastly, Lyft requires
drivers to agree to its terms of service, which provides in part:
[E]ach driver agrees that:
• he is at least 23 years old
• he has a valid driver’s license
• he owns or has the legal right to operate the vehicle and is named on
the insurance policy covering the vehicle
• he will only use the vehicle that has been registered with Lyft
• his vehicle is in good operating condition
• he will not “offer or provide transportation services for profit, as a pub-
lic carrier or taxi service, charge for rides or otherwise seek non-volun-
tary compensation from Riders, or engage in any other activity in a
manner that is inconsistent with such Driver’s obligations under this
Agreement”
• he will not offer rides exceeding 60 miles[.]153
The terms of service also provided that either Lyft or the driver could
terminate the driver’s participation in the Lyft platform.154
Further, Lyft gave drivers a guide, which entailed a list of rules
that stated:
• Phone should always be mounted and plugged into charger
• No talking on the phone (unless it’s the passenger)
• Only pick up Lyft passengers, don’t pick up passengers who hail from the
street or who use other mobile apps
• You should be the only non-passenger in the car (no friends, children or
pets can ride along with you)
• Greet every passenger with a big smile and fist bump
• Keep your car clean on the inside and outside
• Keep your seats and trunk clear for use by your passengers
• Do not request tips.  If asked by the passenger, let them know that the app
will suggest a price
• Do not accept any cash
• Go above and beyond with good service such as helping passengers with
luggage or holding an umbrella for passengers when it’s raining
147. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1071.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1072.
154. Id.
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• If you ever need to cancel a Lyft, call support first.155
Lyft eventually replaced the drivers’ guide with a list of frequently
asked questions on the Lyft website that outlined the requirements in
the drivers’ guide as well as numerous other issues not addressed in
the guide.156
The two plaintiffs in this case were former Lyft drivers who con-
tended they should have been paid as employees, not independent con-
tractors.  The two drivers filed a lawsuit in California against Lyft on
behalf of all drivers in California since Lyft began operating in
2012.157  They alleged, “because Lyft misclassifies its drivers as inde-
pendent contractors, the drivers have been deprived of California’s
minimum wage, reimbursement for work-related expenses, and other
protections that California law confers upon employees.”158
2. The California District Court Addresses Lyft’s Alleged
Misclassification
The court applied the Borello multifactor test, outlined in subsec-
tion I.B.3 of this Note, to determine whether Lyft’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of misclassification should be granted.
The court held “a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff Lyft
drivers were employees[,]” but “because a reasonable jury could also
conclude they were independent contractors, there must be a trial.”159
First, the court noted that the drivers performed services for
Lyft.160  Second, the court discussed how Lyft retained a significant
amount of control over how drivers operated.161  The instructions pro-
vided by Lyft in its drivers’ guide and FAQs are not merely sugges-
tions as Lyft asserts, but are written as commands or prohibitions.162
Further, Lyft could terminate the drivers for cause or for any other
possible reason without cause.163   The court reasoned, “[i]t would be
difficult to rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs were independent
contractors when the most important factor for discerning the rela-
tionship under California law, namely, the right of control, tends to
cut the other way.”164  Beyond the right-of-control factors, several of
the other Borello factors cut in both directions.165  Therefore, the court
denied Lyft’s summary judgment motion because the relationship be-
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1072–73.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1079.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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tween Lyft and the drivers entailed “at the very least sufficient indicia
of an employment relationship . . . such that a reasonable jury could
find the existence of such a relationship.”166
IV. ANALYSIS
Drivers of ride platforms in the sharing economy are likely to be
classified as employees under California law because California is a
pro-employee state that offers greater protections to workers than
those required by the FLSA.167  It is probable the same result follows
under the FLSA because it is construed liberally to provide protections
to a broad class of workers.168  While the drivers may be classified as
employees under both frameworks, the question still remains: should
they be?
A. Drivers for Ride Platforms Are Likely Employees Under
Existing California Multifactor Test
The district courts in O’Connor, the Uber misclassification case,
and Cotter, the Lyft misclassification case were correct in denying the
ride platforms’ motions for summary judgment because there were
factual disputes regarding whether the drivers in California were em-
ployees under the Borello test.169  Absent a clear finding that the fac-
tors favored an independent contractor relationship,170 and because of
the numerous factual disputes, the courts held that the question of
employment should go to a jury.171  Weighing the factors should prove
to be rather difficult for a jury because the Borello multifactor test
cannot be easily applied to Uber and Lyft drivers.172
1. Berwick Does Not Establish that All Uber Drivers Are
Employees
The California Labor Commissioner ruled in Berwick173 that a
driver for Uber was an employee under California’s test for employ-
ment set out in Borello.174  The Hearing Officer found the primary
166. Id. at 1081 (quoting Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2010)).
167. In re United Parcel Serv., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 834, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“The
FLSA does not preempt state law and ‘explicitly permits greater employee protec-
tion under state law.’  In many respects, California law provides broader protec-
tion of employee rights, and in such instances, California law controls.”  (quoting
Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 978 P.2d 2, 8 (1999))).
168. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 3.
169. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1146.
172. See infra section IV.A.
173. See supra section II.C.
174. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6 (Cal.
Dep’t Labor June 3, 2015).
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“right to control” factor weighed heavily in favor of an employment
relationship between Berwick and Uber because Uber controlled every
aspect of the operation.175  Although Uber argued it lacked significant
control over Berwick’s activities, the Hearing Officer stated, “the
Borello court found that it was not necessary that a principal exercise
complete control over a worker’s activities in order for that worker to
be an employee.”176
Based on Berwick, it is possible the Uber drivers in O’Connor could
be found to be Uber’s employees.  The contracts and requirements im-
posed by Uber in both cases were substantially the same.  But there is
also the possibility that the conclusions of the Hearing Officer are in-
correct.  The Hearing Officer is not an appointed judge, and there was
no jury at the hearing to determine the weight of the factors in light of
the many factual disputes.  Further, in 2012, a different California La-
bor Commission ruling held an Uber driver was not an employee,177
highlighting the difficulty in classifying these drivers—the same labor
commission found an independent contractor relationship, and later
an employment relationship, between Uber and its drivers.
In O’Connor, Uber attempted to reference this 2012 decision as
support for a finding that these Uber drivers are not employees.  The
court stated there was no cited case law “suggesting this Court owes
the Hearing Officer’s conclusion any deference, and his conclusion ap-
pears to warrant none.”178  The decision of the Hearing Officer con-
tained only one paragraph, and the court in O’Connor held that it was
wrong.179  In ruling on the issue of employment in O’Connor, no defer-
ence will necessarily be given to Berwick.  There remains the possibil-
ity Berwick correctly applied the multifactor test for employment in
California.  Although one driver’s success in Berwick may entice more
drivers to bring claims of misclassification, it fails to provide the defin-
itive answer as to whether Uber drivers are employees under Califor-
nia law.  The question still remains, even if these drivers are
employees, should they be?
2. Other California Misclassification Cases Suggest Uber and
Lyft Drivers Are Employees
FedEx similarly found itself in misclassification litigation that re-
sulted in a finding of employee status of its drivers under California
175. Id. at *5.
176. Id.
177. Claire Zillman, California’s Uber Driver Decision Could Throw a Wrench into the
Sharing Economy, FORTUNE (June 17, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/
06/17/uber-drivers-are-employees-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
CM9W-W5SW].
178. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1144 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
179. Id.
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law.  In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Systems,180 the court
held FedEx drivers were employees despite their classification and la-
bel as independent contractors.181  FedEx contracted with drivers to
deliver packages.182  The drivers were required to wear uniforms,
drive their own FedEx approved vehicles, and groom themselves ac-
cording to FedEx standards.183
The Ninth Circuit found the primary factor in the Borello mul-
tifactor test of “whether [FedEx] had the right to control the manner
and means of accomplishing the result desired”184 favored a finding of
employment.185  In establishing that FedEx had the right to control
the drivers, the court reasoned, “FedEx can and does control the ap-
pearance of its drivers and their vehicles[,] . . . [t]he times its drivers
can work . . . [and] aspects of how and when drivers deliver their pack-
ages.”186  FedEx required drivers to dress and look a certain way,
have their vehicles painted white, and comply with FedEx vehicle
specifications.187  FedEx structured workdays so that drivers worked
9.5–11 hours each working day and required drivers to follow certain
procedures at the beginning and end of each workday.188  Lastly, driv-
ers were assigned a specific area to deliver packages and had to de-
liver them within a certain window of time to customers
predetermined by FedEx.189  This was sufficient evidence to establish
FedEx controlled the manner and means of accomplishing the result
desired.
The Borello secondary factors did not sufficiently favor a finding
that the drivers were either independent contractors or employees.190
The factors regarding the right to terminate at will, the provision of
tools and equipment, and the parties’ beliefs all slightly favored
FedEx.191  Other factors—the distinct occupation or business,
whether the work is performed under the principal’s direction, the
skill required in the occupation, the length of time for performance of
services, and whether the work is part of the principal’s regular busi-
180. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 753 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
181. Id. at 988.
182. Id. at 984.
183. Id.
184. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal.
1989).
185. Alexander, 753 F.3d at 989–90.
186. Id. at 990.
187. Id. at 989–90.
188. Id. at 990.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 994.  The court analyzed each secondary factor under Borello but found
that the secondary factors, when considered together, did not point strongly in
favor of either employment status or independent contractor status. Id. at 997.
191. Id. at 994–96.
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ness—all favored the drivers.192  The last factor—the method of pay-
ment—was neutral and did not favor either party.193  Although the
secondary factors when considered in combination did not favor an
employment relationship, the primary “right to control” factor did.194
Therefore, the court held the drivers were FedEx’s employees.195
Alexander can be contrasted to Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha Insur-
ance Co.,196 where the court upheld a finding of independent contrac-
tor status under California law.  The Borello primary ‘right to control’
factor was not satisfied because numerous aspects of the relationship
between Arnold and Mutual of Omaha (Mutual) favored a finding of
independent contractor status.197  For instance, Arnold controlled all
aspects pertaining to the solicitation of customers, her position with
Mutual was nonexclusive, and her work was not evaluated, super-
vised, or monitored.198  Further, training was entirely voluntary, she
had to submit one customer application every 180 days in order to
avoid termination, and if she wanted an office, she had to pay a fee.199
The secondary factors of Borello also weighed in favor of indepen-
dent contractor status.200  Although the relationship could be termi-
nated at will—which usually points toward a finding of employment—
this “is not by itself a basis for changing that relationship to one of an
employee.”201  In finding the secondary factors pointed toward Arnold
being an independent contractor, the court noted Arnold’s occupation
was distinct, and she provided her own instrumentalities.202  Further,
she had to pay a fee in order to use the office space, her payment was
based upon commissions, not hours, and both parties believed Arnold
was an independent contractor.203
The Lyft and Uber drivers fall somewhere in between Alexander
and Arnold.  In O’Connor and Cotter, there were a number of factual
disputes regarding the Borello right-to-control test.204  This factor did
not firmly establish the drivers were independent contractors as a
matter of law.205  The courts noted several alleged facts that, if true,
may favor a finding that the ride platforms had a significant right to
192. Id. at 995–96.
193. Id. at 996.
194. Id. at 997.
195. Id.
196. 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 213, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
197. Id. at 221.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id at 220.
202. Id. at 221.
203. Id.
204. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
205. Id. at 1153.
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control the drivers,206 including Uber and Lyft’s rights to terminate
drivers at any time.207  Moreover, Uber instructs drivers on what to
wear, how to carry out tasks, and monitors their performance,208  and
Lyft provides similar instructions.209  The actions of Uber and Lyft
are very similar to the actions of FedEx in Alexander, where FedEx
controlled the appearance of its drivers and their vehicles, the times
its drivers could work, and aspects of how and when drivers deliver
their packages.210  Therefore, Uber and Lyft appear to be more closely
related to Alexander than Arnold because Uber and Lyft have the suf-
ficient right to control their drivers.
In O’Connor some of the Borello secondary factors favored an em-
ployment relationship, while others supported an independent con-
tractor relationship.211  “[T]he secondary factors [did] not clearly cut
in one direction,”212 toward a finding of independent contractor sta-
tus—like in Arnold.  Therefore, the ride platforms appear to be more
closely related to Alexander because the secondary factors, when con-
sidered together, do not strongly favor either employee status or inde-
pendent contractor status.
The court in O’Connor noted that “rarely does any one factor dic-
tate the determination of whether a relationship is one of employment
or independent contract.”213  All factors, both primary and secondary,
in the aggregate would have to strongly favor a finding of employment
in order for a jury to hold these drivers are Uber’s employees.  For the
drivers of Uber and Lyft, it is not definitively clear whether the secon-
dary factors favor employee status or independent contractor status.
Based on the holding in Alexander, the more likely result is that the
primary right-of-control factor is satisfied because Uber and Lyft exer-
cised a significant right to control their drivers, strongly favoring a
finding of employment.
This finding, while likely correct under California law for employ-
ment established in Borello, contradicts most general common sense
conclusions.  Uber and Lyft drivers are not the typical workers that
one would think of as “employees.”  While the law may classify Uber
206. Id. at 1148–53.  For instance, Uber instructed drivers to “ ‘make sure you are
dressed professionally;’ send the client a text message when 1–2 minutes from
the pickup location (‘This is VERY IMPORTANT’); ‘make sure the radio is off or
on soft jazz or NPR;’ and ‘make sure to open the door for your client.’” Id. at 1149
(citations to plaintiffs’ documents omitted).  Further, “there [was] evidence of
drivers being admonished (or terminated) by Uber for failing to comply with its
‘suggestions.’” Id. at 1150.
207. Id. at 1149.
208. Id. at 1151.
209. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
210. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 753 F.3d 981, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2014).
211. O’Conner, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1152–53.
212. Id. at 1153.
213. Id.
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and Lyft drivers as employees, these drivers fall “in the borderland
between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what
is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.”214215
B. Uber and Lyft Drivers are Likely Employees Under the
Expansive View of the FLSA
California law offers greater protections for employees than those
provided in the FLSA, which is why the California test for employ-
ment was applied to the relationship between the drivers and the ride
platforms.216  However, when the state’s protections are less than
those provided to employees by the FLSA, then the FLSA governs, not
state law.217  Many state laws also mirror the provisions of the
FLSA.218  Uber and Lyft not only have to defend against misclassifica-
tion allegations like O’Connor and Cotter in the courts, but the De-
partment of Labor (DOL) may also investigate companies suspected of
misclassification.219  The FLSA provides the DOL with the power to
investigate and remedy wage-and-hour violations, and the DOL can
initiate FLSA enforcement lawsuits against a company.220  Because
“companies must be careful to comply with both the FLSA test and
any applicable state or local test[,]”221 an analysis of the relationship
under the FLSA is relevant.
In evaluating whether an employment relationship exists, the
FLSA follows the economic-realities test, not the common law “right to
control” test.222  This test focuses on “whether the worker is economi-
cally dependent on the employer or in business for him or herself.”223
According to the Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, “most
workers are employees under the FLSA . . . .[and] the scope of the
employment relationship is very broad.”224  Therefore, a court should
analyze the economic realities of the situation under the multifactor
214. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944).
215. See infra section IV.C.
216. In re United Parcel Serv., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 834, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
217. Id.
218. Leonora M. Schloss & Aaron N. Colby, An Ounce of Prevention: Avoiding Wage-
and-Hour Claims, 23 ANDREWS EMP. LITIG. REP., no. 19, Apr. 21, 2009, at 3.
219. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 211 (2012).
220. Id.
221. Thomas McInemey & Justin Scott, Expert Q&A: Labor and Employment Issues in
the On-demand Economy, PRACTICAL L. (Aug. 4, 2015), http://us.practicallaw.com/
7-617-8705?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= [https://perma.unl.edu/8B9F-FSDD].
222. See INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 1; see also supra subsection
II.B.3 (providing background of the common law right to control test).  The com-
mon law right to control test is the primary factor established in Borello when
analyzing whether an employment relationship exists under California law.
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
223. See INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 2.
224. Id.
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test in deciding whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor.
1. The Extent to Which the Work Performed Is an Integral Part
of the Employer’s Business
If the employee’s work is not integral to the business of the em-
ployer, then this factor favors an independent contractor relation-
ship.225  In Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, to determine if migrants’
harvesting of pickles was integral, the court stated, “[i]t does not take
much of a record to demonstrate that picking the pickles is a neces-
sary and integral part of the pickle business.”226  The court in
O’Connor found Uber was a transportation company, not a technology
company.227  Under the logic of Lauritzen, providing transportation is
a necessary and integral part of the transportation business of Uber
and Lyft.  Therefore, this factor favors an employment relationship.
2. The Worker’s Opportunity for Profit or Loss Depending on His
or Her Managerial Skill
If the worker’s managerial skill affects profit or loss, then the
worker is more likely to be an independent contractor.228  While a
worker can increase profits by working more hours and doing his or
her job well, that is not considered a managerial skill affecting profit
or loss.229  Activities of a worker that reflect managerial skill include
“a worker’s decision to hire others, purchase materials and equipment,
advertise, rent space, and manage time tables.”230  This factor favors
an employment relationship—Uber and Lyft drivers do not use their
managerial skills to affect profit or loss.
3. The Extent of the Relative Investments of the Employer and
the Workers
In order for a worker to be an independent contractor, the worker
must have taken some investment.231  The size of the workers invest-
ment is relevant and “should not be relatively minor compared with
225. Id. at 6.
226. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1537–38 (7th Cir. 1987).
227. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141  (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Uber
is most certainly a transportation company, albeit a technologically sophisticated
one.”).  Uber even referred to itself as “Everyone’s Private Driver” and the “best
transportation service in San Francisco,” thus adding to the court’s conclusion
that Uber is not solely a technology company. Id. at 1142.
228. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 7.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 9.
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that of the employer.”232  If it is, the worker is more likely to be an
employee.  In Baker, rig welders provided their own welding rigs cost-
ing the welders $35,000–$40,000.233  When comparing the welder’s in-
vestment to the alleged employer’s investment in the overall business,
the welder’s investment was “disproportionately small.”234  While
some drivers investment in new cars is significant,235 under the Baker
formulation this is “relatively minor” in comparison to Uber and Lyft’s
significant investment in the overall business.
4. Whether the Work Performed Requires Special Skills and
Initiative
In order for a worker to be an independent contractor, the worker
must exercise “business skills, judgment, and initiative.”236  The pos-
session of a specialized skill does not automatically classify the worker
as an independent contractor.237  The skills of the worker should be
used in an independent way for the worker to be classified as an inde-
pendent contractor.238  Uber drivers do not utilize skills in an inde-
pendent way such that they should be classified as independent
contractors.  An Uber or Lyft driver does not need to exercise “busi-
ness skills, judgment, or initiative” to drive passengers once they re-
ceive a ride request through the platforms’ mobile applications.
Therefore, this factor favors an employment relationship between
Uber or Lyft and their drivers.
5. The Permanency of the Relationship
A true independent contractor will not allow a relationship with an
alleged employer that is permanent or indefinite.239  If the relation-
ship between the worker and the alleged employer is indefinite, the
likely result is that the worker is an employee.240  In O’Connor,
whether Uber could terminate its drivers at will was disputed.241
However, the language of the contract between Uber and its drivers
seemed to allow Uber to fire drivers for any reason.  Although Uber
may deactivate a driver’s application if inactive for 180 days—sug-
gesting there is not permanence to the relationship—a driver can eas-
232. Id.
233. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1439 (10th Cir. 1998).
234. Id. at 1442.
235. Benjamin Sachs, New DOL Guidance on Employee Status: News for Uber or Lyft?,
ONLABOR (July 15, 2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/07/15/new-dol-guidance-on-em
ployee-status-news-for-uber-or-lyft/ [https://perma.unl.edu/J5ME-ZWEB].
236. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 10.
237. Id.
238. Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1060 (2d Cir. 1988).
239. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 11–12.
240. Id. at 12.
241. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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ily reactivate the application and begin driving again.  Further, the
driver need only log into the application every so often to prevent
deactivation.  Lyft imposes similar requirements for the termination
of drivers from the Lyft platform.  Therefore, this factor likely favors
an employment relationship because there is no defined end to the
relationship between the ride platforms and their drivers.
6. The Degree of Control Exercised or Retained by the Employer
If the worker is an independent contractor, and thus, “conducting
his or her own business,”242 the worker must control “meaningful” as-
pects of how the work is performed.243  Further, the flexibility of work
schedules is not significant by itself.244  Whether Uber exercised or
retained control over the drivers in O’Connor245 was a notably dis-
puted issue.246  The court noted several details supporting the conclu-
sion that Uber both exercised and retained control.247  However, “no
single factor, including control, should be over-emphasized”248 or de-
terminative.  All factors of the economic-realities test, when analyzed
in the aggregate, favor a finding that Uber and Lyft drivers are em-
ployees protected under the FLSA.  Under the FLSA, it is probable for
an employment relationship to exist between the ride platforms and
their drivers.
C. Existing Labor Laws Should Not Apply to Workers in the
Sharing Economy
Whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor is
difficult to distinguish in this new crowd-sourced, sharing economy.
In Cotter v. Lyft, the court looked to the general understanding of the
terms “independent contractor” and “employee” and reasoned that
“[a]t first glance, Lyft drivers don’t seem much like employees . . . [b]ut
Lyft drivers don’t seem much like independent contractors either.”249
Both state and federal laws do not appropriately address the worker
in this new economy.  These workers are functioning somewhere in
the middle—they do not seem to fit the general understanding of ei-
ther an employee or an independent contractor.
242. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 13.
243. Id.
244. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 1989).
245. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
246. See supra subsection III.B.2.
247. See supra section IV.A.
248. INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, supra note 18, at 15.
249. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Lyft, being one of
Uber’s competitors, has a similar business model to Uber’s—both are ride-shar-
ing applications and rely on the classification of their drivers as independent
contractors.
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The FLSA was passed in 1938.250  At this time, the workforce pri-
marily went to their employer’s place of business for work.251  The test
for whether a worker is an employee easily applied to these workers,
and there was no question these workers were entitled to the protec-
tions under the FLSA.252  But over seventy years later, the workforce
and technologies have changed,253 and the same laws that so easily
applied seventy-eight years ago do not apply without difficulty to a
worker in the new sharing economy.  Today, these workers can gener-
ate an income without ever having to step inside of an office.  In 1938,
Congress could not have envisioned an economy composed of sharing
and on demand labor, and the FLSA “was not written with crowdwork
in mind.”254
While hearing cases regarding misclassification, courts have ex-
pressed their frustrations with applying existing labor laws to these
workers.  For instance, in O’Connor, Judge Chen expressed his opin-
ion that the traditional employment test creates significant challenges
when applied to business models like Uber’s because this test “evolved
under an economic model very different from the new ‘sharing econ-
omy’” and “many of the factors in that test appear outmoded in this
context.”255  Until the legislature enacts new rules applicable to the
sharing economy in particular, the courts have the difficult task of ap-
plying the Borello multifactor test to these workers.256
Further, in Cotter v. Lyft, Judge Chhabria also expressed concerns
of the application of the current test to workers in this economy.257  In
allowing the question of employment to go to a jury, he stated: “[a]s
should now be clear, the jury in this case will be handed a square peg
and asked to choose between two round holes.  The test the California
courts have developed over the 20th century for classifying workers
isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st century problem.”258  The
judge discussed how these factors either point in different directions
or are ambiguous in this context.259  He stressed that without “legisla-
tive intervention, California’s outmoded test for classifying workers
250. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)).
251. Miriam Cherry, A Minimum Wage for Crowdwork?, DIGITAL LAB., http://digital-
labor.org/participants/miriam-cherry [https://perma.unl.edu/JAN8-Z88K].
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
256. Id.
257. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
258. Id. at 1081.
259. Id.
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will apply in cases like this”260 and it will be left to juries to weigh the
factors and make the difficult decision.261
In Cotter, the court contemplated that perhaps workers in the
sharing economy should be considered a new category of worker alto-
gether.262  While these cases emphasized the necessity for an updated
test under California law, this reasoning also applies in the context of
the FLSA—where the law was developed decades ago and could not
possibly have been created with these types of workers in mind.  Tech-
nological advances and social media platforms have changed society,
and the law seems to fall further behind each day.263  The laws ad-
dressing employment should be adapted in light of the new economy
composed of mobile applications and platforms like Uber.264  While
there is not currently a clear answer under the current law, one thing
is certain: a new classification for these sharing economy workers is
necessary.265
A new classification must be developed to provide these workers
with some of the needed protections without burdening innovation, in-
creasing the price of these ride services for consumers, and placing a
great deal of liability on the companies.266  The conflict in the sharing
economy falls between the interests of stimulating innovation and the
need for protecting the workers from potential harms.267  While some
academics believe the FLSA and other labor and employment laws can
adequately classify these workers if applied broadly,268 this would
burden innovation by conferring the protections of the FLSA and
other labor and employment laws to workers who should not necessa-
rily be deemed employees.  Judges encountering the misclassification
question in this context often burden innovation by extending the ex-
isting legal framework of both the FLSA and state laws to the sharing
economy.269
It is clear that “[i]nnovation is a difficult phenomenon to under-
stand, promote, and regulate within and beyond the sharing econ-
omy.”270  Despite this difficulty, changing the laws should be at the
top of the to-do list in order to avoid legal barriers to innovation.271
Broad legislation specifically tailored to the sharing economy will be
260. Id. at 1082.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Malloy, supra note 16.
264. Id.
265. White, supra note 25.
266. Id.
267. Ranchorda´s, supra note 10, at 420.
268. Cherry, supra note 251.
269. Ranchorda´s, supra note 10, at 470.
270. Id. at 422.
271. Kassan & Orsi, supra note 8, at 13.
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more innovation-friendly than the current legal framework.272  Legis-
lators should begin formulating specific rules with the sharing econ-
omy in mind.  “The sharing economy needs a new legal framework.
Current legal frameworks do not suffice.”273
These Uber and Lyft drivers are not employees, but they are not
independent contractors either.  These workers fall somewhere in the
middle of being an employee and an independent contractor.  Courts
attempting to construe laws to accommodate these workers could bur-
den innovation by providing employee protections to workers who do
not clearly fit the definition of an “employee.”  Therefore, future legis-
lation will need to adapt to the sharing economy in order to clarify this
gray area.274
V. CONCLUSION
While Uber and Lyft provide simplicity to customers when a ride is
desired, the changes to the business model of these ride platforms will
be anything but simple if the drivers are classified as employees.  The
question of whether these drivers are employees is a multibillion dol-
lar question for Uber Uber’s $51 billion valuation will suffer a dra-
matic blow if these drivers are classified as employees.  The ride
platforms will be required to provide the benefits and protections that
it has avoided due to classifying its drivers as independent
contractors.
The O’Connor and Cotter opinions rightfully expressed frustrations
with the application of the Borello multifactor test for employment in
California to these drivers in the sharing economy.  While these driv-
ers do not fit neatly into the categories of independent contractor or
employee, it is likely they are employees under existing law because
the factors in the Borello multifactor test—when considered in the ag-
gregate—favor an employment relationship.  Under the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act’s economic-realities test, an employment rela-
tionship between Uber or Lyft and the drivers is also likely.  Post-
O’Connor and Cotter, employers in this economy should beware.  Clas-
sifying workers as independent contractors when there is evidence
favoring a sufficient right to control or the ability to terminate at will
is a costly move—especially after the court in O’Connor and Cotter
held a jury could reasonably find the drivers are employees.
As the sharing economy continues to grow, our labor laws should
grow as well, and adapt to this new economy composed of sharing,
collaboration, and on-demand labor.  In order to avoid legal barriers to
innovative companies, such as Uber and Lyft, our labor laws should
272. Ranchorda´s, supra note 10, at 472.
273. Id. at 475.
274. Malloy, supra note 16.
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change—providing a new classification for employees in the sharing
economy.  A new classification would provide some of the protections
these workers desire, without hindering innovation.  Until then, work-
ers and employers in this economy will continue to be plagued with
the question of who is an employee.
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